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I. INTRODUCTION
The existence of the principle of proportionality as a norm is
undisputed, and military commanders in armed conflicts around the
world apply it continuously. As the principle is formulated in general
terms-prohibiting attacks that may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects, or
a combination thereof, that would be excessive in relation to the
military advantage anticipated-it is also clear that interpreting and
applying the different elements of the principle is no simple task.
This Article shall consider four select issues regarding different
elements of the principle of proportionality.
First is how to determine "excessive" (Part II). International law
does not elaborate on how one must determine what is "excessive."
What is generally accepted, however, is that proportionality is
assessed inter alia on the basis of subjective considerations and
values. The Final Report to the Prosecutor Reviewing the NATO
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Law Department, Military Advocate General's Corps, Israel Defense Forces. LLB/B.
Acc. (Tel Aviv University), LLM (Tel Aviv University). This Article is written in the
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Bombing Campaign in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), for
example, has espoused for this purpose the standard of a "reasonable
military commander." How should this standard be understood and
applied?
Second is interpreting "military advantage" (Part III). Here,
should the military context in which the attack or operation is taking
place matter, and if so, to what extent?
Third is the impact of defensive systems on determining
"military advantage" (Part IV). Many parties to conflicts have some
sort of defensive measures to protect civilians from attack (from
passive systems, such as shelters and air raid warnings systems, to
active defensive systems, such as aerial defense facilities or rocket
interception mechanisms). Should the apparent reduced lethality of
enemy capabilities as a result of these systems be taken into account
when assessing military advantage in attacks against the enemy?
Fourth is the impact of "force preservation" on determining
"military advantage" (Part V). It is axiomatic that in conflict,
preserving one's forces is important. What role should this play in
proportionality assessments?
II. ASSESSING "EXCESSIVENESS" AND A "REASONABLE MILITARY
COMMANDER"
As noted above, customary international law prohibits attacks
that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, or damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, that
would be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated.
Thus, once a commander values both the anticipated military
advantage and incidental damage, he or she must decide whether
one-the expected incidental damage-is not excessive in relation to
the other. When presented this way, it may seem that a
proportionality assessment will always lead to a singular, simple
answer. This is obviously not the case. If comparing apples to oranges
is difficult, comparing incidental damage to military advantage-let
alone assessing whether the former is excessive in relation to the
latter-is very challenging.
Difficulties in weighing two distinct and dissimilar variables
make it particularly challenging to assess how significant the
imbalance between the expected incidental damage and the
anticipated military advantage should be so as to render an attack
excessive.' The primary means in LOAC's toolbox for dealing with
1. Some studies have reached the conclusion that excessiveness in this context
means a "significant imbalance" between the two sides of the equation. HPCR MANUAL
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 98 (2013); Michael
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this problem is the standard of "a reasonable military commander."
The reference to "military commander" in a legal standard does not
simply indicate the identity of the person expected to make an
assessment on proportionality. It first and foremost stresses that a
special skillset is required to make such assessments: just as one has
to be a jurist to properly consider legal questions, only military
commanders can properly make proportionality assessments. Hence,
a standard based on the perspective of a "military commander"
implies that the determination whether an attack was excessive can
only be made with a certain degree of operational expertise. At the
same time, the term "military commander" is quite wide. The
expertise demanded is non-specific, since commanders assessing
proportionality come from different operational backgrounds and
roles; some are infantry specialists making the assessment on the
field, while others may be experts in fires or tanks sitting in a back
office. Another aspect of the term "military commander" is that it
includes a wide range of persons in the military apparatus-from the
most senior officer to non-commissioned officers.2
The standard does not refer to simply any "military commander."
Rather, the "military commander" making the assessment must be
"reasonable." A few observations on this point are warranted. First,
reasonableness implies that the law accepts that assessing
excessiveness is not a matter of reaching the "one and only" answer to
a determination. It would be a mistake to think that in each and
every case of a proportionality assessment there is a single point on a
scale where each and every reasonable military commander agrees
that a proportionate attack becomes excessive. Reasonableness
implies a certain margin of appreciation-a possibility for an array of
different ways of assessing proportionality, each way being
reasonable, hence within the boundaries of the legal framework. This
is especially-although not exclusively-the situation in borderline
cases. The Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign against the FRY itself acknowledged this in its final report
to the ICTY Prosecutor.3
N. Schmitt, Targeting in Operational Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 269, 283 (Terry D. Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2nd ed.
2015).
2. For a more detailed and expert discussion of the meaning of 'reasonable
military commander,' see Geoffrey S. Corn, Humanitarian Regulation of Hostilities:
The Decisive Element of Context, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 763 (2018); Ian Henderson
& Kate Reece, Proportionality under International Humanitarian Law: The
"Reasonable Military Commander" Standard and Reverberating Effects, 51 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 835 (2018).
3. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, U.N. INT'L
CRIM. TRIB. FORMER YUG. ¶ 50 (June 13, 2000), www.icty.org/en/press/final-report-
prosecutor-committee-established-review-nato-bombing-campaign-against-federal
(accessed Jan. 29, 2018) [https://perma.cc58C5-XZ3V] (archived Feb. 27, 2018).
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It should also be noted that the "reasonable military commander"
standard relates to all parts of the proportionality analysis: the
quantification of the expected incidental damage, the evaluation of
the anticipated military advantage, and the comparison between the
two. Each of these parts must be approached and handled reasonably.
Most importantly, this standard explicitly establishes that it is
the military commander who is responsible for implementing the
principle of proportionality. This does not mean, however, that the
legal adviser becomes irrelevant, and lawyers may play different roles
in assisting the commander to implement his or her obligations in
this regard. Most importantly, in my view, is ensuring the
commander's understanding of the principle through legal education,
integration into trainings, and incorporation within military
directives and procedures. The legal adviser may also assist with
reaching a decision concerning individual incidents. In such cases, the
legal adviser can help structure the commander's subjective thought
process and provide the commander the tools to know the reasonable
limits for the decision. The legal adviser can also instruct the
commander regarding possible considerations to be included in the
proportionality determination. For example, not every prima facie
advantage resulting from an attack will be a relevant military
advantage for a proportionality assessment, and not every relevant
military advantage will be sufficiently concrete and direct.
Conversely, there is no additional obligation to consider every harm
to the civilian population that is expected to result from an attack in
the proportionality assessment; this is another issue in which a legal
adviser can assist.
III. "MILITARY ADVANTAGE" IN CONTEXT
Much has been written on the correct interpretation of the
phrase "concrete and direct military advantage." While it is generally
accepted that this phrase excludes purely political or economic gains
as well as highly speculative and hypothetical military advantages,
there are other aspects of the term that remain more complex. One
relevant question is to what degree does the context of an attack
influence the anticipated "concrete and direct military advantage."
There appears to be very little in the way of official statements that
can shed light on state practice or opino juris on this question.
Similarly, it appears that academic discussions have also focused less
on this question than others. Nevertheless, taking context into
account remains crucial, as an attack is always conducted in a
particular context, and the context is likely to be different in light of a
myriad of factors-time, place, resources, directives, and so on.
860 [VOL. 51:857
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First and foremost, the quantification of "military advantage" is
of course heavily dependent on the particular adversary. An attack
that strongly affects the activities of a certain adversary can have a
different or no effect on another adversary. Hence, it is possible that
what may constitute a great military advantage against one
adversary will be of less military value against another. In this
regard, in a conflict where the adversary bases its fighting and goals
upon certain capabilities and methods of conduct, depriving that
adversary of such capabilities and methods will provide a greater
military advantage than in a conflict involving a different adversary,
which employs different capabilities and methods of conduct. This is
true even in the same conflict where the adversary's capabilities and
methods of combat evolve over time.
For example, if it is known that a party to a conflict relies
exclusively on certain vehicles in order to transport combatants to the
front line, then the military advantage in attacking those specific
vehicles would be significant. Geography can also play a role. During
the 2014 Gaza Conflict, for example, the IDF found motorbikes in
cross-border attack tunnels. These motorbikes (and other small
vehicles, such as quadbikes and scooters) were intended for use by
non-state armed groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the
Gaza Strip during the hostilities to quickly move from the densely
populated neighborhoods bordering Gaza and Israel, into Israel's
defensive positions and its civilian communities in order to carry out
attacks and quickly retreat back to Gaza.4 In such a situation, the
military advantage in attacking the adversary's transport vehicles
would seemingly have been greater than if the hostilities were taking
place far away from Israel and with no threat to the civilian
communities across the border. This is also clearly the case for the
cross-border tunnels themselves, in which there is naturally a
significant military advantage in their neutralization.
Protecting one's civilian population is another case of military
advantage that should be considered in context. All of Israel's armed
conflicts in the past few decades have involved deliberate, systematic,
and persistent attacks on its homefront and civilian population.
Indeed, this seems to be the most basic strategy of Israel's immediate
adversaries-to harm the civilian population and way of life-and is
the driving factor in their military development, acquisitions, and
training. This is not limited to Israel's experience, and the military
efforts of the Global Coalition Against Daesh against ISIS and
affiliated groups evidences the same.
4. See, e.g., STATE OF ISRAEL, THE 2014 GAZA CONFLICT: FACTUAL AND LEGAL
ASPECTS 58-105 (May 2015), http://mfa.gov.il/ProtectiveEdgelDocuments/
2014GazaConflictFullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EUH-2T7A] (archived Feb. 27,
2018) [hereinafter 2014 Gaza Conflict Report].
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Such groups often have as their primary goals not the weakening
of the state's military forces and capabilities, but rather the harming
and terrorizing of a civilian population. In such circumstances, it is
clear that taking positive steps to protect the civilian population is
not only the moral duty of the state's military, but also provides a
concrete military advantage. The very definition of military
advantage includes anything that weakens the enemy or hampers its
operational activities. As a result, where an adversary acts to harm
the civilian population, a reasonable military commander will
certainly find military advantage in attacking enemy targets likely
intended to cause harm to the civilian population.
Indeed, in contemporary armed conflicts, one of the central aims
of a military campaign will actually be to protect the civilian
population from attacks. One could argue that this is a fundamental
and underlying shift from wars of the past. In the past, wars were
fought not with the primary aim-tactical or strategic-of stopping or
minimizing civilian harm, but rather in order to weaken the
adversary militarily so as to result in surrender or incapacity to fight.
In contrast, the nature of today's wars means that an army may enter
a specific battlefield tasked primarily with finding and neutralizing
the specific military capabilities of the adversary that it uses to
threaten the civilian population. Thus, attacking rocket launchers
directed towards the civilian population, as well as rocket storage
facilities, will not only be considered to be militarily advantageous; it
may even be prioritized by the attacking party, and the military
advantage attained will be greater than the inherent military
advantage that normally arises in destroying the adversary's means
of warfare. Context indeed heavily affects the operational value of
striking certain targets.
IV. DEFENSVE SYSTEMS AND PROPORTIONALITY
States have consistently sought o adapt to the changes in the
adversary's aims and pursuits described above, including by
developing active defense systems to protect the civilian population.
Should the success of such systems-such as Israel's Iron Dome,
which intercepts rockets-have an impact when planning an attack
against the adversary? Particularly, should we see a lesser military
advantage in attacking the adversary's offensive capabilities, when
such capabilities are less likely to punch through the state's defense
systems and harm the civilian population? In my view, the
employment of defensive measures intended to protect one's own
civilian population-whether passive (such as bomb shelters) or
active (such as missile interceptors)-does not have a significant
impact on a proportionality assessment when considering an attack
862 [VOL. 51:857
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on the adversary's offensive capabilities. This is for a number of
reasons, each sufficient on its own merits.
First, defensive systems are not infallible. This is the case even
for those systems that have had sufficient testing and deployment so
as to know generally their potential for success, and all the more so
for those systems whose capacities are still not fully known or
computable. Even where a rocket interception mechanism, such as
Israel's Iron Dome, successfully intercepts an incoming rocket above a
population center, the debris can cause (and in Israel's case, certainly
has caused) significant harm.5 Second, an adversary will naturally
continuously study and seek to develop methods to overcome such
measures-including by conducting attacks with the full knowledge
that they will be intercepted, in order to conduct research. Third,
rockets, mortars, and other such offensive capabilities possess an
intrinsic military value for any military force, and destroying them
therefore contributes toward weakening the enemy.6
Finally, to suggest that sophisticated defensive capabilities
intended to defend civilians inherently reduce the military advantage
in attacks would create a perverse incentive that completely
undermines the rationales of LOAC. A state that wishes to defeat its
adversary should not be incentivized to reduce the level of defense it
provides to its citizens-doing so would contravene the most basic
humanitarian rationale behind LOAC.
In Israel's case, significant resources and efforts have been
invested in developing various defensive systems to protect its
population against attacks from across its borders. Yet these systems
are not infallible, require large expenditures and a diversion of
resources from other military and defense-related activities, and still
have not negated the threat posed by its adversaries to the civilian
homefront. Constant rocket and mortar attacks from the Gaza Strip,
for example, have continued to affect IDF activities and the
homefront and cause deaths and injuries among the Israeli
population.7 Preventing such harm is a legitimate and important
military advantage for Israel.
5. See, e.g., id. at ch. V.
6. This is especially so in the context considered in the section above, where
one of the primary aims of non-state armed groups has become to attack and terrorize
the state's civilian population.
7. See, e.g., 2014 GAzA CONFLICT REPORT, supra note 4, at ch. V. As well as
the threat from the Gaza Strip, rockets and other projectiles aimed at Israel's civilian
population remains the primary threat in Israel's northern arena. As reported by the
IDF, in a future conflict with Hezbollah, it is assessed that their "main effort will be
placed on firing hundreds of rockets and missiles at Israel per day. The majority of this
barrage will be of high statistical accuracy, with some amount of highly long range
missiles capable of reaching nearly the entire State of Israel. According to an IDF
Home Front Command report that describes the threat Hezbollah will pose to the
Israeli home front in a future war, roughly 1,000-1,500 rockets and missiles will be
launched into Israel [a day], thousands of homes will be hit and hundreds of Israeli
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A rumination on how such an argument would be applied in
practice highlights its defectiveness. How could we expect a platoon
commander, whose soldiers have uncovered a rocket launching unit
hidden in a backyard in the suburb in which they are operating, to be
able to calculate the ability of his or her country's active defense
mechanisms to successfully intercept the rocket and to prevent the
rocket from harming a civilian community, and then to factor this
into the anticipated military advantage in neutralizing that launch
unit?
Indeed, Article 58 of Additional Protocol I requires parties, to the
extent feasible, to protect the population under their control from the
effects of hostilities. It would make little sense to constrict a
military's capacity to fulfill this obligation by limiting the offensive
prerogatives that are clearly recognized and codified in LOAC.
V. FORCE PRESERVATION AND MILITARY ADVANTAGE
Preserving one's forces similarly remains an important military
advantage and retains its important role in a proportionality
assessment concerning individual attacks. The term "preservation" is
deliberate. "Force protection" or "security of forces," as each has been
commonly used, diverts from the proper focus of the legal discussion,
as the terms misleadingly imply that the focus is solely on bringing
the soldiers home safely to their beds. While this is of course a valid
consideration, commanders take measures to protect their forces for
an additional, crucial purpose-so that their forces may successfully
complete their military mission and continue to pursue military
missions in the future. Indeed, it is axiomatic that one's forces hold
military worth. Their training, skills, capabilities, and resources are
of value, and preserving them remains a central element in a military
commander's decision making. Preserving such forces throughout
combat clearly constitutes a military advantage.
It is likewise axiomatic that the military advantage attained
from force preservation is not without limits. A commander may not
inflate the military value of preserving a force beyond its actual
contribution to the accomplishment of the mission. Moreover, the
military advantage resulting from force preservation is context-
dependent. In certain cases the advantage will be greater than in
others, for example when the unit preserved is charged with an
especially crucial and urgent mission.
civilians will be injured or killed. Hundreds of thousands are expected to be evacuated
from their homes." Hezbollah's Threat to the Israeli Home Front, IDF,
https://www.idf.illen/minisites/facts-and-figures/hezbollahlhezbollahs-threat-to-the-
israeli-home-front/ [https://perma.cc/GJS7-WK34] (archived Mar. 26, 2018)
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While force preservation certainly constitutes a military
advantage, in what circumstances does it actually play a role in
proportionality assessments? To suggest an answer to this, consider
an infantry unit trapped in an urban area, sustaining heavy fire.
Clearly, an attack intended to preserve the unit's safety-whether
carried out by the unit itself or by another unit-contains a concrete
and direct military advantage, thus justifying some civilian harm.
Then consider a case of an aircraft on its way to striking an arms
depot, flying at an altitude where it is not threatened by enemy
surface-to-air missiles (in other words, above the threat envelope).
Such an aircraft is more likely to return to base safely than one flying
within the threat envelope. Is this a case where force preservation
plays a role in the proportionality assessment? It appears that the
answer is negative. While flying above the threat envelope is
certainly more militarily advantageous than flying within the threat
envelope, it is arguably irrelevant when assessing the proportionality
of the strike against the arms depot. A reduced risk to the aircraft
does not render attacking the depot more advantageous in the sense
that it now merits greater incidental harm.
At the same time, force preservation is definitely pertinent in
such cases when considering the duty to take precautions. Indeed, the
law does not necessarily require military forces to assume risks and
takes such risks into account. Consider a different example, where
two military objectives are dependent on each other and so attacking
either one of them will suffice from an operational perspective.
Assume that attacks against each target differ in terms of both risk to
the attacking aircraft and the collateral damage expected. Engaging
one target is expected to cause less collateral damage and will require
entering an area containing a large number of anti-aircraft facilities
that have an 80 percent success rate. On the other hand, engaging
the second target is expected to cause greater (although still
proportionate) collateral damage with no risk to the attacking
aircraft. Under customary LOAC, when a choice is possible between
several military objectives for obtaining the same military advantage,
the objective to be selected shall be the one the attack on which may
be expected to cause the least collateral damage.8 It is therefore clear
that in such cases force preservation counts as a military advantage
in the context of precautions, because the two strikes are not
anticipated to yield "the same military advantage."
8. Israel does not consider Article 57(3) of Additional Protocol, which refers to
a similar military advantage, to reflect customary international law in this regard. For
recent official statements regarding Israel's position on this issue, see the 2014 Gaza
Conflict Report, Chapter VI, especially page 181; see also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., LAW OF
WAR MANUAL 259-60 (2016).
2018] 865
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
VI. CONCLUSION
The principle of proportionality, as enshrined in customary law,
is surely one of the most fundamental and important principles in the
law governing the conduct of hostilities. Everyone is bound by it, and
everyone must abide by it. Nevertheless, it is probably easier said
than done. The centrality of the principle does not belie the difficulty
in enunciating what it actually requires-the standards for its
implementation, the interpretations of its elements, and the tests for
compliance.
This Article attempted to share some insights regarding the
principle of proportionality. Particularly, I have stressed how the
implementation of the proportionality obligation remains a
professional issue for the commander, which is obliged to act
reasonably. This in turn is impacted, inter alia, by the commander's
position, rank, training and surrounding circumstances, and context
at the time of the decision. This naturally means that different
commanders are likely to make different decisions, but all may be
deemed "reasonable military commanders" and all may be law-
abiding. Conformity in action does not necessarily equate to legal
compliance.
The other perhaps important point of this Article was to stress
the significance of context. The nature of the hostilities, the
capabilities and abilities of the forces, the place in which the
hostilities occur, the aims of the mission, and more, are all factors
that have a direct impact upon the, scope of legal obligations,
particularly the obligation of proportionality.
These two factors-the "reasonable military commander" and the
importance of context-as well as how we view force preservation are
not only relevant in a discussion of contemporary issues in
proportionality, and are not only relevant to the particular context of
urban warfare against non-state armed groups. They are arguably
relevant to any consideration of the application of this rule. More
than that-but this is for another time-they are equally as relevant
and applicable for the implementation of, and assessment of
compliance with, other fundamental rules of LOAC, such as the
principle of precaution.
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